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Abstract 
In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of 
assertion. I first examine three prominent “counterexamples”: false 
assertion, selfless assertion, and assertion based on mere justified true 
belief. I argue that they all fail to square well with our ordinary intuitions. 
However, the contemporary debate over the norm of assertion depends 
heavily on the method of counterexamples, whose crux is to prompt our 
intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a certain 
kind of assertions. This method has its limits as sometimes the debate 
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simply boils down to a clash of intuitions. I think we can do better. In the 
second part of the paper, I construct a positive argument for the 
knowledge norm, showing that the knowledge norm can be derived from 
the general account of the conversational role of assertion. I argue that in 
order for assertion to play the role it plays in conversation, the knowledge 
norm must hold. 
Keywords: Assertion, The Norm of Assertion, Selfless 
Assertion, Conversational Role, The Knowledge 
Norm ,The Most General Factive Attitude 
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Knowledge Is (Still)      the 
Norm of Assertion 
Some assertions are praiseworthy such as asserting something true 
with adequate reasons. Some assertions are blameworthy such as lying. 
Assertions, thus, are governed by evaluative norms. Recent literature has 
seen an emerging interest in the norm of assertion, specifically the 
question whether knowledge is the norm of assertion. While a case can be 
made that knowledge is the norm of assertion, many had argued that the 
norm of assertion is something weaker than knowledge.  
In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of 
assertion. I first examine prominent counterexamples to the knowledge 
norm. I argue that they all fail to square well with ordinary intuitive 
judgments. Hence, the knowledge norm remains the most intuitively 
plausible account on the table. The contemporary debate over the norm of 
assertion depends heavily on the method of constructing ordinary stories 
that prompt our intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or 
inappropriateness) of a certain assertion. This method has its limits as 
sometimes the debate simply boils down to a clash of intuitions. I think 
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we can do better. In the second part of the paper, I construct a positive 
argument for the knowledge norm, showing that the knowledge norm can 
be derived from the general account of the conversational role of assertion. 
I argue that in order for assertion to play its role in ordinary conversations, 
the knowledge norm must hold.  
The following consists of seven sections. Section 1 introduces the 
knowledge norm of assertion. Section 2 to Section 4 examine and reject 
several prominent objections to the knowledge norm. Section 5 and 6 
derive the norm of assertion from the conversational role of assertion. I 
argue that the knowledge norm is dictated by the unique role assertion 
plays in the ordinary conversation. Section 7 considers some potential 
objections to my view and takes stock. 
I. The Knowledge Norm of Assertion 
Assertions can be praised or criticized in various ways. An assertion 
can be praised as true, sincere, polite, useful, relevant, etc., or be 
criticized as false, insincere, rude, not helpful, irrelevant, etc. Appraisals 
are conducted based on evaluative norms. Hence, assertions are governed 
by various norms. Some norms govern the act of assertion only 
contingently while others necessarily. The norm of politeness, for 
instance, is applicable to assertions only on some occasions; the norm of 
truthfulness, by contrast, is applicable to assertions on all occasions. 
Some norms are norms of assertion qua assertion, while others are norms 
of assertion qua general behaviors or social institutions. The norm of 
sincerity, for instance, is not specific to assertion, but rather a norm of the 
act of communication in general. Let us call the norms that constitutively 
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govern the act of assertion qua assertion the constitutive norms (of 
assertions)1.  
 Following Timothy Williamson (2000: 241), I take the form of the 
constitutive norm of assertion to be the following:2 
 The C Norm (CN): One must : assert that p only if C. 
The relation ‘must’ stands for “the kind of obligation characteristics of 
constitutive rules” (Williamson 2000: 241). Although we may talk of a 
constitutive norm of assertion, CN in effect represents the constitutive 
norm of assertion, since C can be a complex condition.3 In this sense, C 
                                                          
1  Constitutive norms must be distinguished from what Rescorla calls ‘constitutive 
requirements’ (2009 : 101). Constitutive requirements determine whether an act is the 
performance of a certain kind of act. For instance, getting into the basketball court is a 
constitutive requirement of playing basketball, since there is no way one can play the 
game without even getting into the court. Contrary to constitutive requirements, 
constitutive norms do not (at least not necessarily) determine the necessary conditions, 
nor do they jointly determine the sufficient conditions, of performing an act. Rather, 
constitutive norms determine the propriety of performing an act. If one violates the 
constitutive requirement of playing basketball, one fails to play the game. By contrast, if 
one violates the norm of playing basketball, one does not play the game correctly, but one 
does not (at least not necessarily) fail to play the game. Playing the game incorrectly is 
still playing the game (Rescorla 2009; Williamson 2000). 
2 For a different proposal, cf. Rescorla (2009). Rescorla argues that the norm of assertion 
should take the ‘non-restrictive’ form: 
(NR): If one asserts p, then p has C. 
Because of the limitation of space, I will not discuss Rescorla’s proposal here.  
3 For instance, suppose that one thinks that assertions are subject to exactly two constitutive 
norms: 
The Truth Norm (TN): One must : assert that p only if p is true. 
The Belief Norm (BN): One must : assert that p only if one believes that p. 
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is a condition that assertion, and only assertion, satisfies; no other speech 
acts are subject to the condition C. We call the account of assertion that 
regards CN as the constitutive norm of assertion The C account.  
 The recent debate of the norm of assertion has centered on the 
question whether the knowledge norm is the constitutive norm of 
assertion:4 
The Knowledge Norm (KN): One must: assert that p only if 
one knows that p. 
Some linguistic data strongly support the knowledge account (cf. 
Williamson 2000; Unger 1975). First, it is common to ask “How do you 
know?” or “Do you know that?” to challenge an assertion. This indicates 
that asserters have to know the content of their assertions. Second, it is 
also common to express one’s incapacity to answer a question by saying 
“I don’t know”. Since an answer to a question is an assertion, that failing 
to answer is related to the lack of knowledge suggests that assertion 
requires knowledge (cf. Williamson 2000: 84; Reynolds 2002: 140). 
Third, it seems wrong or odd to assert “p, but I do not know p”. A natural 
interpretation of this phenomenon is that asserting that p and asserting 
that one does not know that p are incompatible, indicating that assertions 
                                                                                                                     
The True Belief Norm (TBN): One must: assert that p only if one believes that p truly. 
4 Proponents include Williamson (2000), Hawthorne (2004), DeRose (2009), Unger (1975), 
Reynolds (2002). Opponents include Weiner (2005), Douven (2006), Kvanvig (2003; 
2009), Lackey (2007), Williams (2002). Sometimes the debate is about whether or not 
knowledge is a constitutive norm instead of the constitutive norm of assertion.  
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go hand in hand with knowledge.5  
Traditionally, knowledge is regarded as justified true belief not 
suffering from Gettier Cases. Let us call justified true belief constituting 
knowledge K-justified true belief,6 while justified true belief falling short 
of being knowledge, mere justified true belief. Against the knowledge 
account, some argued that the constitutive norm of assertion is something 
weaker than knowledge. Given that knowledge is K-justified true belief, 
objections to KN come in three main forms: the proposals that truth is not 
a constitutive norm of assertion, that belief is not a constitutive norm of 
assertion, and that K-justification is not a constitutive norm of assertion. 
The following three sections deal with them respectively. None of them, 
as I will argue, stands up to close examination. 
II. Assertion and the Truth Condition 
It is widely agreed that one should assert only what is true. Paul 
Grice has called it a supermaxim of conversation: “Try to make your 
                                                          
5 It has also been argued that the knowledge account can explain the lottery case—the 
asserter is not allowed to assert that a lottery ticket does not win, because the asserter does 
not know it. However, this explanation of the lottery case presupposes a controversial 
claim that “no probability short of 1 warrants assertions” (Williamson 2000: 250).  
6 Some philosophers have argued that the there is no noncircular analysis of K-justification, 
namely, the concept of K-justification depends on the concept of knowledge (Williamson 
2000). The analysis of knowledge is not my focus here. Nor is it relevant to the present 
discussion. However, proponents of the unanalyzability of knowledge should not find the 
thesis that knowledge is K-justified true belief hard to accept, since K-justification as used 
in the present work needs not be conceptually independent of knowledge. 
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contribution one that is true” (1987: 27). “We may equally say that 
assertions are supposed to be true,” Bernard Williams says, “or…that they 
are expected to be true” (2002: 66-7). “There is no gap,” John Searle says, 
“between making a statement and committing oneself to its truth” (2001: 
184).  
In general, an assertion is subject to criticism if it is false, or if the 
asserter believes that it is false. Consider retraction, which is a reliable 
indicator of a violation of the norm of assertion. If one asserts something, 
and later discovers its falsity, one should retract what is asserted. By 
contrast, even if one asserts something based on a blind guess, so long as 
it turns out to be true, one has no incentive to retract the assertion, though 
one may have an incentive to apologize for asserting it (cf. Kvanvig 2003; 
2009; also see Section 4). Moreover, an asserter is subject to criticism if 
she asserts what she believes to be false. A typical case is lying. An 
asserter qua asserter is blameworthy if she tells a lie.7  
 Some philosophers argue that proper assertions need not observe 
the truth condition. Imprecise and false assertions offered in the 
evil-demon world, according to Jennifer Lackey8 (2007: 607-8), are cases 
in point. Concerning the former, Lackey writes that: 
                                                          
7 A more interesting question is whether an asserter, without an intention to lie, can 
legitimately assert something she does not believe. For more on this point, see Section 3. 
8 In later works (2011; 2016), Lackey even argues that knowledge is not enough for the 
norm of assertion. For brevity’s sake, I will not deal with this view here. Notice, however, 
that this last claim, as Lackey (2016) correctly notes, is not incompatible with her view 
presented below.  
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[S]uppose that you ask me how tall I am and I assert that I 
am 5 feet, 4 inches. Strictly speaking, however, suppose that 
I am 5 feet, 3½ inches. My assertion about my height, then 
violates [the truth condition] since it is false that I am 5 feet, 
4 inches tall. Similar cases abound… In all of these cases, the 
assertions in question are false because they are not 
absolutely precise, but they nonetheless seem perfectly 
proper. (Lackey 2007: 607-8) 
Arguably, imprecise assertions prevail over daily conversations. But are 
they perfectly proper? Notice that the truth condition can be overridden by 
pragmatic considerations. In emergencies, for instance, it is proper to 
assert something although you are not sure of its truth. For instance, 
seeing that you are about to eat a colorful mushroom, I shout, “That is 
poisonous!” even though I do not know that it does (cf. Williamson 2000: 
256). My assertion may be proper in the sense that it serves my current 
purposes (i.e., to save your life), but improper as an assertion qua 
assertion, since were I to know that the mushroom is not poisonous, I 
would have the incentive to retract my assertion.  
To reply, Lackey argues that cases of imprecise assertions cannot be 
explained by the factor of emergency, since imprecise assertions do not 
necessarily involve emergency situations (Lackey 2007: 608). I am 
doubtful about Lackey’s reply as other pragmatic considerations may be 
involved here. For instance, it is obvious that imprecise assertions are 
proper vis-à-vis the convenience and/or efficiency of conversation. 
Suppose that one knows that one is exactly 5 feet 3½ inches. It might still 
be proper for one to assert, say, “I am 5 feet, 4 inches” instead of “I am 5 
feet, 3½ inches”, provided that one wants to save communication cost and 
that asserting such a slight falsehood does not matter much for the present 
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purposes. But in this case, the asserter is well aware that she has just been 
speaking loosely and is ready to admit that, strictly speaking, her assertion 
is incorrect. In general, imprecise assertions can be proper when we 
intend to speak loosely for the sake of the convenience and/or efficiency 
of conversation. Conversational convenience aside, however, imprecisely 
assertions are still improper qua assertion.  
 Let us look at false assertions offered in the evil-demon world. 
According to Lackey: 
[I]f my twin, who is the unfortunate inhabitant of an evil 
demon world, acquires on the basis of experiences 
indistinguishable from my own the same sorts of beliefs as 
me, then her beliefs should be regarded as reasonable 
[provided my belief is reasonable]. Given this, my twin also 
should not be subject to criticism for offering the same 
assertions as me, even if the truth value of our respective 
assertions varies significantly. (Lackey 2007: 607) 
For the sake of argument, let us agree with Lackey that her twin as an 
asserter is not subject to criticism for offering the same assertions as 
Lackey does, even though her assertions are false. But this does not show 
that her assertions are not defective in other aspects.  
Some philosophers propose the distinction between primary and 
secondary propriety/impropriety in order to show the impropriety of such 
cases (DeRose 2009; Weiner 2005). An assertion is primarily proper (or 
improper) if it observes (or fails to observe) the norm of assertion. An 
assertion is secondary proper (or improper) if the asserter reasonably 
believes (or fails to reasonably believe) that her assertion observes the 
norm. In Lackey’s twin-assertions case, the twin’s assertion is primarily 
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improper since her assertions are in fact false, though it is secondarily 
proper.  
 Lackey argues that the notion of secondary propriety/impropriety is 
spurious (2007: 603-7). The notion of observing/violating a norm, Lackey 
argues, does not leave room for secondary propriety/impropriety. If an act 
violates a norm, it does not make sense to say that it is proper in a 
secondary sense. Similarly, if an act observes a norm, there is no way it 
will be secondarily improper. Lackey thus concludes that: 
[E]ither a speaker is behaving appropriately and is not subject 
to criticism qua asserter, in which case she has not violated a 
norm of assertion, or she is behaving inappropriately and is 
subject to criticism qua asserter, in which case she has 
violated a norm of assertion. There is simply no room for acts 
being secondarily proper or improper. (Lackey 2007: 604) 
I feel sympathetic to Lackey’s view that an act can only observe or 
violate a norm, leaving no room for it being secondarily improper or 
proper. But this does not debar something similar to the distinction 
between primary and secondary propriety/impropriety from applying to 
assertion, since assertion like other propositional attitudes such as belief, 
knowledge, perception, etc. manifests an act/object ambiguity (cf. 
Williams 2002: 67). The term ‘belief’, for instance, may denote either the 
act of believing or the content believed. When one says, “S’s belief is 
false,” the predicate ‘is false’ clearly applies to the content of S’s belief. 
By contrast, when one says, “S’s belief is irrational,” the predicate ‘is 
rational’ can be correctly used to describe not the content of S’s belief, 
but S’s act of believing. Likewise, the term ‘assertion’ may denote either 
the act of asserting or the content asserted.  
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Even if we discard the notion of secondary propriety/impropriety, 
the act/object ambiguity of assertion remains. The idea most people share, 
contrary to Lackey, is that assertions can be subject to criticism in two 
ways: an assertion may be subject to criticism due to the act of asserting 
or the content of the assertion. For instance, if an asserter intentionally 
asserts something she believes to be false, her assertion is subject to 
criticism since the act of asserting is subject to criticism qua assertion 
(this is true even if the assertion turns out true in the end). Moreover, if 
one asserts something false unintentionally, and later finds out her 
mistake, she will have an incentive to retract her assertion, indicating that 
an assertion may be subject to criticism due to its content being false, 
regardless of whether the act of asserting is subject to criticism or not.   
 Jonathan Kvanvig (2003; 2009), also an opponent of the truth 
condition, is well aware of the act/object ambiguity of assertion. He 
points out that there are “two quite different things a person might be 
doing in taking back an assertion. The person might be taking back only 
what is said, or she might be taking back the saying of it” (2003: 25). 
However, Kvanvig further argues that only the saying itself (i.e., the act 
of asserting) is relevant to evaluate an assertion; what is said (i.e., the 
content of an assertion) has nothing to do with the norm of assertion: 
Only when the speech act itself is at fault, do we have reason 
to think that some norm of assertion is at work; when only 
the content of the assertion needs to be taken back, the 
assertion itself is not at fault…norms of assertion are norms 
governing a certain type of human activity, and thus related 
to the speech act itself rather than the content of such an act. 
(Kvanvig 2009: 147) 
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False assertions, according to Kvanvig, do not violate the norm of 
assertion.  
 Kvanvig’s claim is puzzling since it cannot explain an asserter’s 
incentive to take back her assertion, when proven false. If an asserter 
wants to take back what she says, this shows that her assertion is 
defective in some ways. But if it is not for the violation of the norm of 
assertion, what is the reason for doing so? Another problem is that even if 
we agree with Kvanvig that the norm of assertion governs only “a certain 
type of human activity”, it still does not follow that the constitutive norm 
of assertion is not related to the content of assertion, for it is obvious that 
false assertions prompt the act of retraction in a way that true assertions 
do not. Moreover, Kvanvig’s idea that the norm of assertion is the norm 
“related to the speech act itself rather than the content of such an act” is 
mistaken. As Bernard Williams correctly points out, although the content 
of an assertion might be shared by other speech acts, only false assertions 
are subject to objection (2002: 67-8). For instance, the content of an 
assertion can be identical to the content of a supposition or denial. 
However, in cases where the content is false, only assertions, rather than 
suppositions or denials, are subject to objection. This shows that the 
constitutive norm of assertion is not only related to the speech act itself, 
but also to its content.9 
                                                          
9 Kvanvig also argues that if you need to apologize, then a certain norm is violated. By 
contrast, if you only need to take back assertion, without the need to apologize, then no 
norm is violated (2009: 146ff.). This point is implausible, as the violation of a norm is not 
always manifested by the act of apology. For instance, there is no need to apologize if a 
basketball player violates the three-second rule.  
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III. Assertion and the Belief Condition 
Many philosophers have argued for an internal relation between 
assertions and beliefs. Kent Bach says, “an assertion essentially is the 
expression of a belief” (quoted from Hindriks 2007: 394). Similarly, 
Donald Davidson says, “[w]hat we do in making an assertion is represent 
ourselves as believing what we say” (2005: 123). Frank Hindriks 
formulates this idea as: “To assert that P is to utter a sentence that means 
that P and thereby express the belief that P” (2007: 400). Williams further 
thinks that not only a speaker expresses his belief via assertion, but he 
also “intends the person addressed to take it that he believes that P” (2002: 
74). If assertions essentially express the asserter’s beliefs, the commonly 
held idea is tantamount to the claim that the belief condition is a 
constitutive norm of assertion.  
 Igor Douven (2006) has proposed two reasons against taking the 
belief condition as a constitutive norm of assertion.10 Firstly, Douven 
argues that the belief condition, according to Grice, is already a maxim of 
conversation—the maxim is: “Do not say what you believe to be false”11 
(Grice 1987: 27). Accordingly, “there is no need to build that as a 
requirement into the rule of assertion” (Douven 2006: 460), since the 
maxim of conversation is enough for explaining why assertions require 
beliefs. I find Douven’s reason untenable. Just because the belief 
                                                          
10 Douven does not specify which response he prefers. But it seems that he is leaning 
toward the second one.  
11 Douven takes a stronger interpretation of this maxim as “not to say what we do not 
believe to be true” (2006: 460).   
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condition is a norm of conversation in general it does not mean that it 
cannot be a constitutive norm of assertion; in fact, if the belief condition 
is a norm of conversation, and if to assert is take part in a conversation, 
the belief condition should be a constitutive norm of assertion, since it 
essentially governs assertions.  
 Douven’s second reason is that, in some cases, asserting without 
believing is legitimate qua assertion. He describes the following situation: 
You are responsible for the safety of the population in a 
given area, and one of your superiors informs you of an 
imminent threat. The reported threat is of a nature so terrible 
that you cannot right away get yourself to believe it (you are, 
as some would say, still “in denial”). The situation calls for 
immediate evacuation of the area, though, and it is now your 
main duty to inform the authorities responsible for that. Still 
numbed by the message you received and still not being able 
to believe it, you nonetheless do manage to inform them, 
more or less by repeating what you were just told. (Douven 
2006: 461) 
Douven argues that your assertion that informs the authorities in this case 
is legitimate qua assertion, since the assertion is “perfectly credible to 
you”, you have justification for it, and you are doing “what you ought to 
do under the given circumstances” (Douven 2006: 461).  
Similarly, Lackey argues for what she calls selfless assertions. She 
describes a case of selfless assertion as follows:  
A devoutly Christian teacher Stellar believes the falsity of 
evolutionary theory. However, Stellar notices that there is 
overwhelming evidence against her belief and she knows that 
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her belief of the falsity of evolutionary theory is entirely 
based on personal faith on creationism. However, she thinks 
that as a teacher, she needs to teach materials that are well 
supported by evidence. Hence, she asserts to her students in 
the classroom: 
(3)  Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus. 
(Lackey 2007: 599)  
Lackey concludes that Stellar, qua asserter, is not subject to criticism in 
any relevant sense, and she goes even further to claim that, as an asserter, 
Stellar is “appropriately subject to praise” due to asserting what she thinks 
is well supported (Lackey 2007: 559). Douven’s example is on a par with 
Lackey’s selfless assertions, for these cases, at their core, consist of three 
components listed by Lackey:  
[F]irst, a subject, for purely non-epistemic reasons, does not 
believe (and hence does not know) that p; second, despite this 
lack of belief, the subject is aware that p is very well 
supported by all of the available evidence [or in Douven’s 
term “perfectly credible”]; and, third, because of this, the 
subject asserts that p without believing and, hence, without 
knowing that p. (Lackey 2007: 599) 
However, to say that the selfless asserter qua asserter is not subject 
to criticism at all is implausible, let alone that the asserter qua asserter is 
subject to praise. For one thing, a selfless asserter disbelieves that p for 
purely non-epistemic reasons, regardless of all of the available evidence 
supporting p. This seems to challenge seriously her status as an epistemic 
agent, whose aim is to obtain truths and avoid errors, given that evidence 
seems to bear no weight on (the forming and sustaining of) her beliefs. If 
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the selfless asserter is not a proper epistemic agent, there are qualms to 
take selfless assertions as genuine data. Just as the dementia’s actions 
should not be considered as data for a moral theory, selfless assertions 
should not be taken as data for a theory of the norm of assertion.  
For another thing, it is widely accepted that if one disbelieves that p, 
then one does not believe that p is true, since belief aims at truth 
(admittedly, this claim is vague. Also see Valleman 2000). Hence, if a 
selfless asserter asserts that p without believing that p, she asserts 
something she does not believe to be true (if she believes that p is true, 
then she believes that p is true without believing that p, which is worse). 
However, this is problematic, since if one does not believe that p is true, 
one should assert “Some think that p” or “It has been argued that p” rather 
than “p”. Asserting something that you do not believe to be true flat-out is 
generally subject to criticism. 
IV. Assertion and the K-Justification Condition 
Proper assertions require some sort of evidential norms. As 
Williamson points out “[i]t is somehow better to make an assertion on the 
basis of adequate evidence than to make it without such a basis” (2000: 
245). An assertion is subject to criticism if the asserter is making a wild 
guess. No one, as far as I know, contends that assertions do not abide by 
evidential norms of some sort. Some theorists even argue for a certain 
evidential norm as the constitutive norm of assertion (e.g., Lackey 2007; 
Douven 2006). According to the knowledge account, assertions observe 
the norm that one must assert that p only if one has K-justification for p, 
since knowledge implies K-justification. However, some theorists argue 
that assertions do not require a condition as strong as K-justification; a 
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weaker justification condition is all we need.  
One account is that assertions can be legitimate even if the asserter’s 
evidential basis for what she asserts is less than K-justified. Matthew 
Weiner argues that predictions and retrodictions embody this feature: 
Predictions and retrodictions are generally acceptable in the 
absence of knowledge precisely because the most likely and 
satisfactory warrant for believing their truth is not sufficient 
for knowledge. (Weiner 2005: 238) 
The idea is that some predictions or retrodictions are acceptable even if 
the asserter apparently lacks K-justification. For simplicity’s sake, let us 
focus on retrodiction.12 Weiner’s example is about Sherlock Holmes 
being in a crime scene. Holmes scans the scene and asserts: 
(4) This is the work of Professor Moriarty! It has the mark of 
his fiendish genius. (Weiner 2005: 231) 
Suppose that (4) is true and that Holmes’s retrodiction is based on a 
hunch (i.e., Holmes’ justification for (4) is not sufficient for knowledge). 
Weiner argues that retrodictions like (4) are counterexamples to the 
knowledge account, since they are ordinary sentences uttered in an 
ordinary setting, and “their evidential bases should not determine whether 
we count them as assertions” (Weiner 2005: 231)—in other words, since 
retrodictions like (4) are assertions, KN is false.  
Weiner’s argument, however, confuses constitutive norms with 
                                                          
12 The following discussion also applies to prediction, the other kind of assertion on which 
Weiner’s paper focuses. 
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constitutive requirements (cf. Rescorla 2009). The constitutive norm of 
assertion determines whether or not an assertion is a good one (or whether 
or not an assertion is subject to criticism), while the constitutive 
requirement determines whether or not an act counts as a performance of 
assertion (also see footnote 1). The debate of the norm of assertion is not 
about the constitutive requirement, but the constitutive norm. Specifically, 
the debate is not about whether or not (4) is an assertion, but whether or 
not (4) is proper (or whether or not (4) is subject to criticism). Proponents 
of the knowledge account will probably agree with Weiner that (4) is an 
assertion, but they will deny that (4) is not subject to criticism, since 
Holmes’s assertion of (4), at any rate, is not based on proper evidence.  
Perhaps Weiner would reply that not only are retrodictions like (4) 
genuine assertions, they are indeed proper assertions. This reply is not 
convincing, since Holmes’s assertion is in an intuitive sense subject to 
criticism. Suppose that we ask Holmes, “How do you know?” Holmes 
might reply, according to Weiner, “I don’t know that Professor Moriarty 
did it—I don’t have any direct evidence for that—but my retrodiction is 
that he did it” (cf. Rescorla 2009: 238). However, this reply does not 
exempt Holmes from criticisms, since we may still feel being cheated 
knowing that his assertion is simply based on a hunch. We may complain: 
“If you don’t know it, you shouldn’t say it. Or you should tell me that you 
think that is the work of Professor Moriarty.”13  
                                                          
13 Another reply is to argue that in this case, Holmes does know (4), since in such cases, it is 
not unusual for Holmes to simply assert (4*) instead: 
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Lackey (2007: 611) and Kvanvig (2009: 146-7) have argued that 
some assertions based on mere justification are not improper. They make 
two distinct claims : 14 first, the mere justification condition is enough for 
assertions, and second, mere justified true belief is the constitutive norm 
of assertion. The problem of the first claim would become obvious once 
we notice a crucial difference between K-justification and mere 
justification. That is, mere justification is defective in the sense that it 
essentially depends on epistemic accidentalities in a way that 
K-justification does not. It follows that an act of assertion based on mere 
justification is inherently defective, and is thereby subject to objections. 
The same cannot be said of assertions based on K-justification. 
The second claim might seem plausible, for an asserter would have 
no incentive to retract her assertion of p if she realized that she does not 
know that p but merely justifiably believes p truly. Assertions based on 
mere justified true belief pass the retraction test. However, this does not 
necessarily entail that mere justified true belief is the norm of assertion. 
The retraction test is solely about the content of one’s assertion. But 
assertion can be subject to criticism even if what is asserted is true. As 
noted, the act of asserting a true proposition can sometimes be 
blameworthy. If one asserts that p while merely believing truly that p, we 
(the third-party who are aware of the defectiveness of one’s epistemic 
                                                                                                                     
Cf. DeRose (2009, 98, footnote 20). Thanks to Matthew McGrath for pointing out this 
material. 
14 In his (2011), Kvanvig further argues that the defeasible character of the norm of 
assertion provides further support for the view that assertion observes the norm of 
justification. For simplicity’s sake, I will not address this argument here.   
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position with respect to p) will still find one’s assertion inappropriate. 
Smith justifiably believes that Jones will get the job, and he knows that 
Jones has ten coins in his pocket (cf. Gettier 1963). Smith thus asserts, 
“The man with ten coins in his pocket gets the job.” Unbeknown to Smith, 
he is the one who will get the job, and he also has ten coins in his pocket. 
Intuitively, it seems that Smith should not have asserted, “The man with 
ten coins in his pocket gets the job.” Smith is not blameworthy qua 
asserter, but still, something seems objectively wrong in Smith’s act of 
asserting. 
V. Assertion and Conversation: Part I 
Despite alternative accounts that emphasize on conditions weaker 
than knowledge being the norm of assertion, the knowledge account 
remains the most prominent view on the market. The aforementioned 
discussion depends characteristically on intuitive judgments. I have 
shown that the truth condition, the belief condition, and the 
K-justification condition are supported by our intuitive judgments. 
However, opponents of the knowledge account also appeal to our intuitive 
judgments. In all alleged counterexamples, there is a crucial step of 
showing that assertions without knowledge can be “intuitively” proper. I 
have argued that no such proposal holds. Particularly, all alleged 
counterexamples are subject to criticism in one way or another.  
One might complain that what we have done so far is to argue 
against the opponents’ intuitive judgments by resorting to our intuitive 
judgments. But this presupposes that our intuitions are correct. A question 
thus naturally arises: can we explain the correctness of our intuitions? In 
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the following two sections, I offer such an explanation. The general 
approach is to give a genealogical story of the function assertion plays in 
ordinary conversations, and then ask what norm this function dictates. 
The argument below substantiates the plausible thesis that assertion aims 
at improving the conversational participants’ understanding of the world 
(this will become clear as we proceed). If successful, the argument will 
offer a nice complementary justification for the knowledge account.  
Ordinary conversation is norm-bound. By this, I do not mean that 
ordinary conversation consists in a finite application of a set of strictly 
defined norms. As Davidson (1986) points out, successful 
communications are generally not determined or predicted by norms; 
there is no ‘interpretation algorithm’ the application of which suffices for 
successful communication. 15  The norm-governed character of 
conversation that I have in mind consists in the unique role each type of 
speech act plays. A speech act that fails to play its role is subject to 
criticism. For the present purposes, I will focus on assertion.  
A variety of tasks can be accomplished in ordinary conversations. 
One of the most important tasks is to convey or exchange correct 
information regarding the reality. The main tool for accomplishing this 
task is assertion. By asserting that p, the speaker commits herself to the 
truth of p (cf. Searle 1976: 10-11) and invites the hearer to accept p as 
                                                          
15 The core idea is that to grasp what the speaker says usually demands more than linguistic 
knowledge (Davidson 1986: 107; see also Pietroski 1994: 109). Linguists have long held, 
in a similar spirit, that understanding of what is said requires ‘on-line interpretation’, 
interpretation that requires both linguistic as well as non-linguistic (especially contextual 
and/or encyclopedic) knowledge.  
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being the case. The speaker is held accountable for what she asserts such 
that she is blameworthy if asserting falsehoods, or that she is required to 
retract her false assertion. When one wonders and asks the question 
whether or not that p, her question can be answered by asserting p or the 
denial of p. Such characteristics are specifically not shared by other 
speech acts. For instance, asking a question is neither an act of conveying 
information nor an act of commitment to a certain truth. One is not 
required to retract one’s question if it turns out that the question is 
wrongly framed. Nor is the inquirer held accountable for the question she 
asks.  
How exactly does assertion play the role of conveying or exchanging 
correct information? A helpful model is to regard asserting that p as 
having a determinative role in shaping what the conversational 
participants’ picture of the world (i.e., what they deem as true, false, or 
up-for-grabs). That is, assertion improves the picture of the world. 
Robert Stalnaker’s pioneering work on conversation (1978) has 
offered much we need for the present discussion. The following is based 
on Stalnaker’s model with slight modifications. Let us say that, in a 
conversation, each participant has presupposed a set of propositions (viz. 
background information) and is ignorant of another set of propositions. I 
will call the set of propositions constituting what a conversational 
participant takes for granted “BACKGROUND”. The set of propositions 
incompatible with BACKGROUND is called “MISTAKE”. MISTAKE 
consists solely of propositions that the subject regards as false. In contrast 
to BACKGROUND and MISTAKE, there is the set that I will call 
“IGNORANCE”, which contains propositions that the subject regards as 
“live options”, i.e., she does not know whether they are true or false. 
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IGNORANCE consists solely of propositions that are compatible with 
both BACKGROUND and MISTAKE. Members of IGNORANCE 
represent issues about the world of which the subject is ignorant. In an 
intuitive sense, IGNORANCE, together with BACKGROUND and 
MISTAKE, gives rise to the subject’s understanding or picture of the 
world. 
In the ideal case, BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and IGNORANCE 
are shared by different conversational participants, or the sets of 
BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and IGNORANCE of different 
participants largely overlap. For simplicity’s sake, I will talk about the 
shared BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and IGNORANCE of a group of 
conversational participants. Nothing hinges on this convenient stipulation; 
the argument below will still hold if one opts for distinguishing the 
speaker’s BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and IGNORANCE from the 
hearer’s.  
Assertion plays a crucial role in shaping, improving indeed, the 
conversational participants’ understanding of the world (viz., 
IGNORANCE, BACKGROUND, and MISTAKE). Suppose that p is 
asserted, and the hearer accepts it. If p is already in BACKGROUND, 
then nothing changes—asserting that p does not provide new information 
as p has already been taken for granted. Suppose that before the assertion, 
p is in the set of ignorance. After the assertion, p will then be “extracted” 
from IGNORANCE and put into BACKGROUND, meaning that p is now 
regarded as true by the speaker and the hearer. When BACKGROUND 
receives a new member p, it must be so adjusted such that propositions in 
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BACKGROUND and/or IGNORANCE that are incompatible with p 
together with BACKGROUND have to be put into MISTAKE. 16 
Similarly, the logical consequences of p and BACKGROUND, if they are 
not already in BACKGROUND, must also be put into BACKGROUND. 
In real life, however, people sometimes fail to see the incompatibility 
among the propositions they take for granted and/or the propositions they 
remain ignorant of, and they often fail to see what follows logically from 
p and BACKGROUND. This just shows that people are cognitively 
limited agents. But even cognitively limited agents should “update” their 
picture of the world in a way that preserves consistency and is closed 
under logical inference.17   
Consider the following example. Suppose that BACKGROUND 
consists of the propositions Obama is the President18 and Obama likes 
ice cream, and that IGNORANCE contains the propositions Obama is a 
male, Obama is not a male, There is a male who likes ice cream, and No 
male likes ice cream. Suppose that the speaker asserts that Obama is a 
male, and the hearer accepts it. The proposition Obama is a male will 
then be extracted from IGNORANCE and be added to BACKGROUND. 
By contrast, the proposition Obama is not a male will be put into 
MISTAKE for it is incompatible with Obama is a male and 
BACKGROUND. Likewise, IGNORANCE will be further reduced such 
that the proposition There is a male who likes ice cream is to be put into 
                                                          
16 The incompatibility relation includes logical as well as conceptual incompatibility.   
17 Cf. Williamson (2000: 192ff.) for a nice discussion of how one can follow a rule even one 
is not always in a position to know that the rule has been obeyed correctly.  
18 Throughout this paper, propositions will be italicized.  
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BACKGROUND, while the proposition There is not a male who likes ice 
cream will be added to MISTAKE. 19  Altering the sets of 
BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and IGNORANCE in such a way seems to 
improve the conversational participant’s understanding of the world, for 
in an intuitive sense, the participants are no longer ignorant of whether or 
not Obama is a male or whether or not there is a male who likes ice 
cream.  
The issue is more complicated as (accepted) false assertions also 
have a similar effect. But only true assertions can help the conversational 
participants gain (correct) information about the world. Even though false 
assertions may reduce IGNORANCE in as much the same way as true 
assertions do, they generally will do so in a way that fails to improve the 
participants’ understanding of the world. For instance, suppose that 
IGNORANCE contains the propositions Obama is a male and Obama is a 
female. If the speaker asserts that Obama is a female, and the hearer 
accepts it, IGNORANCE will thus exclude both Obama is a male and 
Obama is a female—the former will be put into MISTAKE, while the 
latter, BACKGROUND. In a sense, the conversational participants are no 
longer “ignorant” about whether or not Obama is a female. But, in 
another sense, the participants are really ignorant about this fact, since 
they have mistakenly regarded Obama as a female. False assertions do not 
really reduce our ignorance, if reducing ignorance implies a better 
understanding of the world. Accordingly, if assertions play the role of 
improving the conversational participants’ picture of the world, their role 
                                                          
19  Stalnaker thinks that an assertion only has the effect of reduction, i.e., reducing 
IGNORANCE (1978: 86ff.). But I think the opposite can happen as well.  
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is fulfilled only if they are true. It is thus not surprising that Grice calls it 
a supermaxim of conversation that one should try to make one’s 
contribution to the conversation by asserting something true (cf. Grice 
1987: 27).  
That said, the conversational role of assertion dictates the truth norm 
to be a constitutive norm of assertion:  
 The Truth Norm (TN): One must : assert that p only if p is 
true.  
This explains why many find TN attractive and why one generally has the 
incentive to retract her false assertions (provided that she does not intend 
to deceive).  
 TN does not exhaust the constitutive norm of assertion. As noted 
above, assertion like other propositional attitudes manifests the act/object 
ambiguity, too. TN naturally governs the content-related facet of assertion. 
False assertions are subject to criticism in a way that true assertions are 
not. But assertion also has a speech-act-related facet. An act of asserting 
something can be subject to criticism even if what is asserted is true. If 
one intends to deceive but fails, one’s assertion is still objectionable—not 
because of what is asserted, but because of the act of asserting. In the next 
section, I will turn to the speech-act-related facet of assertion, namely, the 
asserter has to be held accountable for what she asserts.   
VI. Assertion and Conversation: Part II 
Although, as noted, accepted false assertions are able to reduce 
IGNORANCE and thereby extend BACKGROUND and MISTAKE, they 
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can do so only at the expense of undermining (the accuracy of) the 
participants’ picture of the world. If assertion is to play the role of 
improving the picture of the world in ordinary conversations, a certain 
mechanism that prevents false propositions from entering into 
BACKGROUND must be installed. To this end, the asserter is held 
accountable for what she asserts. The act of assertion is objectionable if 
the asserter is ignorant about what she asserts. Holding one accountable 
for what one asserts, then, is an effective way to prevent false 
propositions from being presupposed.  
 Some might claim that to hold the asserter accountable for what she 
asserts is to require the asserter to be able to defend what she asserts (cf. 
Brandom 1983). When one asserts that p, it is often appropriate for the 
hearer to ask, “How do you know that q (which is an alternative to p) is 
not the case?” Perhaps, one does not need to be able to defend one’s claim 
against all challenges. But it does seem that one is obligatory to defend 
one’s claim against reasonable challenges.  
Is the asserter always obligatory to defend what she asserts, if 
reasonable challenges arise? Not really. For one thing, one’s ability to 
grasp the truth of p may exceed one’s ability to offer proper justification 
for p. I heard my mother’s voice on the radio and immediately recognized 
that she was on the radio. I then said, “My mom is on the radio.” If 
someone were to challenge me how I know that, I might not be able to 
defend my claim appropriately except by pointing out the fact that it 
sounded like her to me. Still, it seems that my act of assertion is not 
subject to objections. Furthermore, one’s assertion may not be 
objectionable even if one is not in a position to offer justification for what 
one asserts at all. A chicken sexer asserts that the chick in the basket is a 
male. When challenged, however, she is unable to give reason for her 
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claim. Suppose that the chicken sexer’s ability to distinguish the gender 
of chicks is reliable and that she does not intend to deceive, it seems that 
her act of asserting is immune to criticisms. Therefore, what we need is 
not that the asserter’s ability to defend what she asserts, but rather that the 
asserter has a strong epistemic position with respect to what she asserts. If 
the asserter’s epistemic position with respect to p is weak, she is 
somehow blameworthy if she decides to assert that p.  I check the magic 
8 ball and learn that the President is in Taipei. I then assert that the 
President is in Taipei. If it turns out that the President is in fact in Taipei, 
I am not required to retract my claim. Still, my act of asserting that is 
objectionable.  
 As a first approximation, one’s epistemic position with respect to p 
consists in the propositional attitude one has toward p. It seems plausible 
that the asserter being held accountable for what she asserts dictates the 
following norm: 
The Attitude Norm (AN): One must: assert that p only if one 
<s that p (where <-ing stands for propositional attitudes). 
Not all propositional attitudes are suitable. Doubting that p, for instance, 
is not a constitutive norm of asserting p. More precisely, AN should be 
constrained by TN, which is a constitutive norm of assertion. That is, not 
only does one have to <s that p, p also needs to be true. As a result, the 
propositional attitude in play in characterizing the constitutive norm of 
assertion has to be factive: 
The Factive Attitude Norm (FAN): One must: assert that p 
only if one Φs that p (where Φ-ing stands for factive 
propositional attitudes). 
FAN has to be further restricted, as there are two kinds of factive 
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attitudes (Williamson 2000: 32ff.). Some factive attitudes such as seeing, 
remembering, knowing, etc. are semantically unanalyzable—the terms 
that denote such attitudes are not synonymous with any complex term 
whose meaning depends on the meaning of its parts (or such attitudes 
cannot be analyzed non-circularly by other concepts). Some attitudes are 
semantically analyzable in this sense such as believing truly, guessing 
correctly. Call them semantically unanalyzable factive attitudes (SUFAs) 
and semantically analyzable factive attitude (SAFAs) respectively. 20 
SUFAs, as Williamson points out, can be syntactically analyzable. ‘Could 
feel’, for instance, is an SUFA (Williamson 2000: 37).  
SAFAs are not the suitable candidate for the norm of assertion. In 
order to be held accountable for p, the asserter’s epistemic position with 
respect to p must be relatively strong. However, bearing an SAFA toward 
p does not guarantee strong epistemic position. Consider guessing 
correctly. If S makes a wild guess that p and gets lucky, S guesses that p 
correctly without having a strong epistemic position with respect to p. 
The same holds for other SAFAs such as believing truly, supposing 
correctly, etc.  
SUFAs, by contrast, do not face the same problem. If S bears an 
SUFA toward p, it seems that S’s epistemic position with respect to p is 
relatively strong. Consider seeing. If one sees that p, then S’s epistemic 
                                                          
20 Williamson calls what we here call semantically unanalyzable factive attitudes (SUFAs) 
‘factive mental state operators (FMSOs)’. While he also discusses what we here call 
semantically analyzable factive attitudes (SUFAs), he does not give them a label. Since 
Williamson has his own account of mental states, to which I want to remain neutral, I 
have opted for the present terminology.  
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position with respect to p is strong. The same holds for other SUFAs such 
as perceiving, remembering, knowing, etc. Viewed in this light, FAN 
should be circumscribed by SUFAs. That is: 
 The Factive Attitude Norm' (FAN'): One must: assert that p 
only if one Ωs that p (where Ω-ing stands for SUFAs).  
FAN' satisfies the conversational role of assertion, as it implies that what 
is asserted is true. Moreover, by requiring the asserter to bear a certain 
SUFA Ω-ing toward p, FAN' also implies that the asserter has to be in a 
strong epistemic position with respect to p.  
 One question naturally arises: how strong one’s epistemic position 
with respect to p has to be in order to satisfy FAN'? The answer, quite 
surprisingly perhaps, is that it has to be as strong as knowledge. That is, as 
long as one’s epistemic position with respect to p is strong enough for S 
to know that p, one is in a position to satisfy the norm of assertion.21 The 
reason is that all SUFAs imply knowledge (Williamson 2000: 33ff.). 
Seeing that p, recalling that p, regretting that p, lamenting that p, etc. all 
imply knowing that p. To follow Williamson’s terminology, knowledge is 
the most general SUFA (cf. Williamson 2000: 39). Why is it the case? 
Some SUFAs manifest one’s ways of knowing that p. John knows that he 
had put the milk back in the refrigerator because he remembers that he 
had put the milk back in the refrigerator. Mary knows that the cat is on 
the mat because she sees that the cat is on the mat. Some SUFAs manifest 
                                                          
21 One may have epistemic position with respect to p strong enough for knowing p without 
actually knowing that p. For instance, one can have such a strong epistemic position with 
respect to p without believing that p. By the same token, one can be in a position to 
satisfy the norm of assertion without actually satisfying the norm.  
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one’s attitudes towards what is known. Jason regretted that he had come 
along because he knew that he had come along. John hates that Jeremy 
made fun of him because he knows that Jeremy made fun of him. Either 
way, SUFAs imply knowledge. To claim that one SUFA Ωs that p while 
admitting that one does not know that p sounds paradoxical. It sounds odd 
for one to claim, for instance, “I remember that he was our teacher, but I 
don’t know that he was our teacher.” Such assertions sound as odd even 
with a third-person singular term as the subject. Consider the assertion 
“John regrets that he’d come along, but he does not know that he’d come 
along.”  
The fact that knowledge is the most general SUFA is of particular 
importance here. For FAN' together with this fact implies the knowledge 
account: 
The Knowledge Norm (KN): One must: assert that p only if 
one knows that p. 
It may not be obvious initially, but it appears quite plausible, once it is 
pointed out, that KN is what is needed in order for assertion to play its 
conversational role. Given that the conversational role of assertion is to 
improve the accuracy of the conversational participants’ picture of the 
world, assertion must adhere to KN. For one thing, KN implies that what 
is asserted must be true; it embodies the ideal that only truths go into the 
picture of the world. This explains why the asserter generally has the 
incentive (or is required) to retract false assertions. For another, in order 
to prevent false propositions from entering into the picture of the world, 
the norm of assertion must hold the speaker accountable for their 
assertions. KN guarantees that the asserter has a sufficiently strong 
epistemic position with respect to what she asserts. This explains why it is 
usually proper to challenge someone’s assertion by asking “How do you 
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know?” and why the asserter qua asserter is often subject to criticism if 
she asserts something she does not really know. 
VII. Taking Stock 
I have completed my positive argument for the knowledge account. 
Let us briefly consider some possible objections. First, I have argued that 
altering BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and IGNORANCE in the 
aforementioned way is the unique role assertion plays in the game of 
conversation. Against this view, some might object that other speech acts 
could play the same role as well. For instance, supposition is also 
intended to have the same effect on BACKGROUND, MISTAKE, and 
IGNORANCE (Stalnaker 1978: 87). On closer examination, however, 
supposition does not satisfy the aforementioned conversational role. To 
suppose that p is to put p into BACKGROUND tentatively or 
hypothetically. Supposing that p thus gives rise to a hypothetical 
reasoning of some sort. The hypothetical nature of supposition implies 
that one is free to suppose something false and that one does not (at least 
not necessarily) have to retract one’s supposition if it turns out to be false. 
If so, supposition does not always improve the participants’ 
understanding of the world, a crucial role, as we have seen, that assertion 
plays in ordinary conversations.  
Second, following Williamson (2000), I take knowledge to be the 
most general SUFA. Some might disagree. Kvanvig (2003) argues that 
understanding is factive, but does not imply knowledge. Arguably, 
understanding is also semantically unanalyzable. If so, understanding 
seems to be a counterexample to the thesis that knowledge is the most 
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general SUFA. To reply, notice, firstly, that it is not clear that that 
understanding is factive, as clearly one can understand a false theory. The 
phlogiston theory, for instance, can still be understood nowadays. 
Secondly, it is not even clear that understanding is a propositional attitude. 
The natural objects of understanding are subject matters or theories, not 
proposition. For instance, it is normal to say that someone understands 
mathematics, but a bit odd to say that this person understands that 1 + 1 = 
2.22 Hence, the status of understanding being an SUFA remains dubious.  
Matthew McGrath had suggested (in conversation) that foretelling is 
an SUFA that does not imply knowledge. To foretell that p implies that p 
is true; one cannot not foretell something that does (will) not happen. But 
to foretell that p does not imply knowing that p. For instance, it is proper 
to assert, “Although John foretold that p, he didn’t really know it.” But 
foretelling is really not an SUFA, as it is semantically 
analyzable—‘foretell’ is synonymous with ‘predict correctly’ (or 
foretelling can be analyzed as predicting correctly). Hence, foretelling is 
really an SAFA instead.  
I do not know if there are genuine SUFAs that fail to imply 
knowledge. But, perhaps, the claim that all (ordinary) SUFAs imply 
knowledge is unnecessarily too strong for the present purposes. As a 
                                                          
22 The phrase ‘S understands Q’ where ‘Q’ stands for a sentence often means that S 
understands the meaning of Q. For instance, when someone says, “I understand 1 + 1 = 2,” 
the statement has a natural interpretation that the subject understands what ‘1 + 1 = 2’ 
means (another natural interpretation is that the subject understands the underlying 
‘mechanism’ that renders one plus one equaling two, indicating that the object of 
understanding are subject matters rather than propositions). This interpretation of 
‘understand’ suggests that ‘understand’ does not denote a propositional attitude, for a 
propositional attitude is directed to the proposition p, rather than to the meaning of ‘p’.  
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generic category, SUFAs capture one’s epistemic position with respect to 
p, which sanctions one to assert that p. The aforementioned discussion 
can be regarded as a Carnapian philosophical explication (cf. Quine 1951: 
25) of the notion of SUFAs. The general approach adopted here is to 
identify the conversational role of assertion, and then ask what norm it 
dictates. SUFAs have been pointed out as the kind of attitudes suitable for 
playing the role. Even if ordinary SUFAs do not always imply knowledge, 
it suffices to say that SUFAs that specify the conversational role of 
assertion do imply knowledge.23  
Let us take stock. The knowledge account is intuitively plausible, as 
testified by how well KN handles ordinary linguistic data (cf. Section 1). 
There are alleged counterexamples, but none has succeeded (cf. Sections 
2-4). I have tried to contribute to the debate by constructing a novel 
argument, which offers a principled reason for the knowledge account. 
The idea is that the essential role that assertion plays in conversations is to 
improve the conversational participants’ understanding of the world. I 
have argued that in order to fulfill this role, assertion must be governed by 
KN (cf. Sections 5 & 6). Knowledge is the constitutive norm of assertion. 
This argument, if succeeds, offers a nice reply to the worry that the 
knowledge account is theoretically unmotivated, which has occasionally 
arisen from the literature. For instance, when examining issues related the 
norm of assertion, Douven once criticizes that the knowledge account is 
not “a consequence of any of our commitment” (2006: 456) applicable to 
a wider context, insinuating that the knowledge account cannot be derived 
                                                          
23 Admittedly, this just scratches the surface of a more general research program. But, for 
simplicity’s sake, the project will not be carried on here.  
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from more general concerns. The previous analysis of the conversational 
role of assertions shows that Douven is wrong. The knowledge account 
can indeed be derived from a more general account of conversation.  
In addition, the present argument and the method of intuitions, which 
has been widely used in the literature, complement each other well. While 
it is certainly legitimate, the method of intuitions has its own limitations. 
In particular, the method sometimes leads us astray and sometimes falls 
short. Sometimes opponents of the knowledge account fail to distinguish 
intuitive judgments regarding assertion qua assertion from intuitive 
judgments arise from other (usually pragmatic) considerations. Lackey’s 
appeal to the propriety of imprecise assertion mentioned above (cf. 
Section 2) is a case in point. Sometimes appealing to intuitive judgments 
may end in stalemate, an irresolvable clash of intuitions. For instance, if 
someone were to challenge one of our previous conclusions that true 
assertions based on wild guesses are subject to criticism qua assertion (cf. 
Section 4) and claimed that she had found nothing wrong with such 
assertions, we would not be able to convert her to accept our conclusion 
by emphasizing how intuitively plausible the conclusion is to us. The 
present work, if correct, contributes a novel principled reason for the 
knowledge account, independent of and complementary to the method of 
intuitions.  
Admittedly, many interesting issues have not been given enough 
discussion or have been left off entirely. A fascinating issue to which I 
have devoted no attention here is (mental) judgment. As widely agreed, 
there is a close connection between judgment and assertion. Assertion is 
like verbal judgment and judgment like mental assertion. Given that 
knowledge is the norm of assertion, does the same carry over to judgment 
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such that knowledge is also the norm of judgment? While I am 
sympathetic to the view of knowledge as the norm of judgment, a further 
development will be left for another occasion. 
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